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INTRODUCTION 
On June 17, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (“UNHRC”) narrowly passed the “Human Rights, 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” Resolution 
(“Resolution”).1 The Resolution expresses “grave concern at 
acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, 
committed against individuals because of their sexual 
orientation and [sic] gender identity.”2 It aims to prohibit the 
criminalization of individuals based on their sexual activities, 
and/or sexual orientation, as well as for their sexual identity. 
The Resolution is binding on UNHRC members, but does not 
provide any penalty for lack of compliance. Moreover, it was 
highly contentious and passed with a very narrow margin of 
twenty-three to nineteen, with three abstentions.3 Yet, human 
rights activists instantly hailed it as a success. This Article seeks 
to answer the following question: is this Resolution the written 
expression of an existing customary norm, which already 
prohibits all countries from criminalizing, and even 
discriminating against homosexuals and transgendered 
individuals, or reversely, is it merely an additional wishful step in 
the creation of such a norm, but without any binding force to 
date on permanent—and explicit—objectors to the said norm? 
This Article hypothesizes that the first answer is the correct 
one. It recognizes that no international treaty to date specifically 
prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation or sexual identity, in the same manner that the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination4 or the Convention on the Elimination of 
                                                                                                                                     
1. See Human Rights Council Res. 17/19, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th 
Sess., May 31–June 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (June 15, 2011). 
2. Id. at 1. 
3. States supporting the resolution: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, 
Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Poland, the 
Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. States against the resolution: Angola, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Uganda. Abstentions: Burkina Faso, China, and Zambia. 
Human Rights Council, Advance Unedited Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th 
Sess., at 107, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.30 (June 2011). 
4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art.2, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
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All Forms of Discrimination against Women5 respectively forbid 
state-condoned racial or gender discrimination. It also 
acknowledges that the practices, as well as the beliefs, of states in 
terms of discrimination based on sexual identity/orientation are 
far from being uniform. However, this Article posits that treaty-
based obligations already exist as to the prohibition of such 
discrimination, and that short of a specific international treaty 
banning such discrimination, one can imply such a ban from 
other clauses in widely-ratified treaties. A survey of recent 
international and regional judicial decisions will confirm that 
such implicit reading is possible and does not depart from 
classical positivism. However, this Article will then argue that 
custom as a primary source of international law goes further 
than the expression of the consent of unitary states to existing 
norms. It argues reversely that the nature of custom as a source 
of International Law allows it to constantly evolve as a socially-
constructed order, especially in the field of human rights, and 
that, in the presence of a growing opinio juris by the 
international community that favors nondiscrimination, 
persistent objection cannot justify exception. 
I. TREATY-BASED PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
This Part first establishes that international human rights 
treaties, by virtue of their purpose, have to be constructed as 
permitting a dynamic, and thus progressive, interpretation of 
the terms they used, moving toward expansion and not 
restriction of rights. This is followed second by a survey of the 
broad international and regional treaty-based protection against 
discrimination and a correlated positive obligation for states to 
promote equality. Third, the materials presented below 
demonstrate that there exists protection against discrimination 
often beyond what treaties list as objective status. In all the 
instruments mentioned, the phrase “any other status” indeed 
provides an open-ended guarantee of equal treatment for all, 
regardless of status, even if the status is not explicitly mentioned, 
as is often the case for religion, race, or gender. Finally, this Part 
emphasizes that there is no objective reason or criteria to 
                                                                                                                                     
5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
art.2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
388 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:385 
discriminate against sexual identity/orientation group in the 
enjoyment of individual civil and economic rights, thus making 
homosexual and transgendered individuals part of a “protected” 
status. Several international and regional case law and decisions 
confirm all those aforementioned assertions. 
A. Treaties Interpretation and Human Rights 
This Section ascertains whether the law on interpretation of 
treaties allows for a possible “developmentalist” reading of a 
treaty, which would view the treaty as enlarging the scope of 
rights it contains, as opposed to an “authentic” reading, which 
would have the agreement of all parties.6 Eduardo Jiménez de 
Aréchaga recalls the use of two interpretive approaches at the 
1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties: one 
recommending that the interpretation of treaties be solely based 
on the “common and real” intention of all parties; the other, 
providing for a textual approach, whereby the intent is to 
“establish what the text means according to the apparent 
signification of its terms.”7 Jiménez de Aréchaga highlights the 
fact that at the end, the International Law Commission 
recommended the latter approach, now embodied in the 
Vienna Convention: A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.8 
More importantly, in terms of interpreting human rights 
treaties, the “purpose” of such treaties is paramount. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights exemplifies this viewpoint 
when stating that: 
[O]bjective criteria of interpretation that look to the texts 
themselves are more appropriate than subjective criteria 
                                                                                                                                     
6. An “authentic” interpretation receives the agreement of all parties as to the 
meaning of a term of a term, as opposed to a “unilateral” interpretation. See CHARLES 
DE VISSCHER, PROBLÈMES D’INTERPRÉATION JUDICIARE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC 20–21 (1963). 
7. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, in 
159 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 42–48 (1978). 
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  
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that seek to ascertain only the intent of the Parties. This is so 
because human rights treaties . . . “are not multilateral 
treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the 
reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the 
contracting States;” rather “their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings, 
irrespective of their nationality, both against the state of 
their nationality, both against the State of their nationality 
and all other contracting States.”9 
As a result, by the very nature of their purpose, human 
rights treaties should not be interpreted in favor of the freedom 
of states concerned. Quite the opposite, they are intended to 
favor individual liberties. In this light, we can now turn our 
attention to specific international and regional human rights 
agreements. 
B. The Principle of Nondiscrimination 
At the international level, the three main documents 
forming the so-called International Bill of Rights establish 
nondiscrimination and the correlated principle of equality as 
being central to the enjoyment of all fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists 
these rights and freedoms, which the two Covenants, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), then seek to protect.10 Several 
Articles ought to be mentioned from the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in this regard: 
Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights . . . Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
                                                                                                                                     
9. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on 
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3., ¶ 50 
(Sept. 8, 1983).  
10. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status . . . . 
Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. 
All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination.11 
These Articles provide the framework later reinforced by 
Article 26 of the ICCPR.12 The Article states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.13 
Finally, the third prong of the ICESCR includes similar 
nondiscrimination provisions in Article 2(2): “The States Parties 
to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”14 
C. “Other status”: An Open-Ended Proposition 
The phrase “other status” is open-ended, meaning that the 
preceding lists are not exhaustive, and, quite to the contrary, 
offer the possibility of other categories. For example, in Gueye v. 
France, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) posited its view 
that the phrase “other status” in Article 26 protected retired 
Senegalese soldiers from discrimination based not only on 
nationality but also on their social, economic, and financial 
situations.15  
                                                                                                                                     
11. UDHR, supra note 10, arts. 1–2, 7.  
12. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 26. 
13. Id. 
14. ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 2(2). 
15. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 35th Sess., Commc’n No. 196/1985: France 
(Gueye v. France), ¶ 9.4, CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (Apr. 6, 1989). 
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Similar broad provisions against discrimination regardless 
of status, listed or not, appear in all major regional instruments 
on human rights. In the African Charter, for example: 
Article 2: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment 
of rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the 
present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, 
ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any 
other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or 
other status . . . . 
Article 3: (1)Every individual shall be equal before the law. 
(2). Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of 
the law.16 
Accordingly, the African Commission in Legal Resources 
Foundation v/ Zambia ruled that: “[t]he right to equality is very 
important. It means that citizens should expect to be treated 
fairly and justly within the legal system and be assured of equal 
treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of the rights 
available to all other citizens.”17 
At the Inter-American level, both instruments, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(“American Declaration”) and the American Convention on 
Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (“American 
Convention”), provide for equality and keep an open-ended 
interpretation of status, whether they are identified as “factors” 
or “social conditions.”18  
Article II of the American Declaration states: “All persons 
are equal before the law and have the rights and duties 
established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, creed or any other factor.”19 Likewise, Article 1 of 
the American Convention (Obligation to Respect Rights) 
                                                                                                                                     
16. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 2–3, June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.  
17. Legal Resources Foundation v/ Zambia, Afr. Comm’n on Human and 
Peoples’ Rts., Communication No. 211/98, ¶ 63 (May 7, 2001).  
18. See Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.23 (May 12, 1948) [hereinafter 
American Declaration]; Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. 
19. American Declaration, supra note 18, art. 2. 
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provides that: “Parties to this Convention undertake to . . . 
ensure to all persons . . . the free and full exercise of those rights 
and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other 
social condition.”20 
Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Obligation of nondiscrimination) also 
states that “[t]he States Parties to this Protocol undertake to 
guarantee the exercise of the rights set forth herein without 
discrimination of any kind for reasons related to race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth or any other social condition.”21 
Finally, at the European level, the cornerstone of 
nondiscrimination appears first in Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”): “The enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.”22 
The Article is reinforced in Protocol 12, entered into force 
in 2005, which intends to broaden the field of application of 
Article 14 beyond the rights included in the ECHR: 
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
                                                                                                                                     
20. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
21. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 3, opened for signature Nov. 17, 1988, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999).  
22. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public 
authority on any ground such as those mentioned in 
paragraph 1.23 
Note that the phrase “such as those” is not exclusive of other 
grounds. The Explanatory Report to the Protocol published by 
the European Council acknowledges that the list of 
nondiscrimination grounds in Article 1 is the same as that listed 
that in Article 14 of the Convention: 
This solution was considered preferable over others, such as 
expressly including certain additional non-discrimination 
grounds (for example, physical or mental disability, sexual 
orientation or age), not because of a lack of awareness that 
such grounds have become particularly important in today’s 
societies as compared with the time of drafting of Article 14 
of the Convention, but because such an inclusion was 
considered unnecessary from a legal point of view since the 
list of non-discrimination grounds is not exhaustive, and 
because inclusion of any particular additional ground might 
give rise to unwarranted a contrario interpretations as 
regards discrimination based on grounds not so included.24 
It is, however, the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights that goes the furthest in elucidating status, 
by explicitly including sexual orientation.25 For example, Article 
21, entitled Nondiscrimination, provides:  
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.26 
                                                                                                                                     
23. Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, C.E.T.S. No. 177. 
24. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT TO PROTOCOL NO. 12 TO THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
¶ 20 (2000), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/reports/html/177.htm. 
25. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, 2000 O.J. C 
364, at 13 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, the Charter holds the same legal status as other European Union 
treaties. See, e.g., JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 159 (2010). 
26.  Charter of Rights, supra note 25, art. 21 (emphasis added). 
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This review demonstrates that both international and 
regional instruments affirm the existence of freestanding rights 
to equality beyond the explicitly listed rights. The task at hand is 
now to prove whether sexual orientation and/or sexual identity 
by themselves can be considered a “status” when they are not 
explicitly mentioned. If this can be proven, the result is that 
sexual orientation and sexual identity are not objective and 
reasonable bases for discrimination. 
D. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity as a Status 
Some judicial decisions have bypassed this issue (which 
seems to be, to date, the “easier” reasoning) by recognizing 
rights of homosexuals or transgendered individuals under the 
broader category of “sex”; or they have protected same-sex 
partners’ sexual acts under the cover of privacy rights. In Toonen 
v. Australia, for example, the HRC did both.27 In this case, the 
HRC found that Tasmanian laws criminalizing sexual relations 
between consenting males violated Toonen’s right to privacy 
protected under the ICCPR. The laws “constituted an unlawful 
and arbitrary interference with the privacy of the applicant, 
contrary to Article 17(1) of the ICCPR.”28 Since the violation of 
Article 17 was enough in itself, the HRC did not consider 
whether Article 26 was violated. It nonetheless remarked that 
“the reference to ‘sex’ in Articles 2(1) and 26 includes sexual 
orientation.”29  
A similar reasoning applied in the European Union 
(“EU”), where the Court of Justice for the European Union 
(“Court of Justice”) has addressed discrimination against 
transgendered and transsexual individuals as a form of sex 
discrimination. In P. v. S., the Court of Justice prohibited the 
dismissal from employment of a transsexual individual.30 The 
Court recalled that the “the right not to be discriminated 
against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human 
rights whose observance the Court has a duty to ensure” and 
                                                                                                                                     
27. See Toonen v. Australia, No. 488/1992, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994). 
28. See INTERIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 140 (2011). 
29. See Toonen, No. 488/1992 at ¶ 8.7. 
30. P. v. S., Case C-13/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2143, ¶ 24. 
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that the EU directive protecting this right could not be limited 
to a person being of a particular sex.31  
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), used 
the right to privacy to prevent discrimination several times, for 
example in the case of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,32 and 
subsequently in the cases of Norris v. Ireland,33 and Modinos v. 
Cyprus.34 In all cases, the ECtHR found that domestic laws 
criminalizing consensual private sexual relations between adults 
of the same sex were contrary to the right to respect for private 
life laid down in Article 8 of the ECHR. Finally, in the case of X. 
v. Iceland, the ECtHR expanded the concept of privacy to social 
identity by affirming that privacy encompassed the “right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings 
especially in the emotional field, for the development and 
fulfillment of one’s own personality.”35 
E. Sexual Orientation or Identity: Not a Reasonable Exception 
Other judicial decisions have gone further than stopping at 
the boundaries of rights of privacy, recognizing at times that 
sexual orientation or gender identity do not offer a 
“reasonable” or “objective” criterion for exception to the 
prohibition of discrimination.36 Indeed, it is notable that there is 
no such thing as a blanket prohibition of discrimination—not 
every difference in treatment can amount to discrimination.37 In 
                                                                                                                                     
31. Id. ¶ 19. 
32. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981). 
33. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1988). 
34. Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1993). 
35. X. v. Iceland, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87 (1976). 
36. Some cases still go the other way. See, for example, Grant v South-West Trains 
Ltd., in which the Court of Justice for the European Union held that  
The refusal by an employer to allow travel concessions to the person of the 
same sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship, where such 
concessions are allowed to a worker’s spouse or to the person of the opposite 
sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship outside marriage, does not 
constitute discrimination prohibited by Article 119 of the EC Treaty [or the 
Equal Pay Directive].  
Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-636, ¶ 50. 
37. See William R. Bryant, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 211 (1998) 
(“A film or stage director legally may decide to consider only male applicants when 
searching for someone to play the role of Tarzan, Romeo, or Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Similarly, a director may consider only females when casting for the role of Wonder 
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addition, all documents recognize that a state may limit some 
rights in cases when another person’s rights are at stake, or if 
there is a conflict between rights, in limited times of national 
emergency.38 No limitations of rights can violate peremptory 
norms,39 but some derogations are permitted in a restrictive 
fashion for matters of public interests.40 However, in all cases, if 
the state discriminates, discrimination must be duly justified. 
The ECtHR noted in Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom that: “A 
difference of treatment is discriminatory if it ‘has no objective 
and reasonable justification’, that is, if it does not pursue a 
‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.’”41 
Indeed, this relationship of proportionality finds a relevant 
illustration in the aforementioned Toonen case, in which the 
HRC rejected the Tasmanian claim that the criminalization of 
homosexual acts was a public health measure designed to 
prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and furthermore, a prohibition 
based on moral grounds.42 The HRC found that criminalization 
was not a reasonable and proportionate means, nor was it a 
“reasonable” action in terms of the protection of morals.43  
Finally, there is growing institutional and judicial 
recognition that not only sexual acts but also the identity of 
homosexuals, as such, should be protected under the term 
                                                                                                                                     
Woman, Scarlett O’Hara, or Cleopatra. But if she were to exclude all but African 
Americans when casting for the role of Muhammad Ali, Uncle Remus, or Rosa Parks, 
she would be violating federal law.”) 
38. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4(1) (stating that parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) that are dealing with 
public emergencies that “threaten[] the life of the nation” may take actions derogating 
from their obligations under the ICCPR). 
39. See id. arts. 4(1), 7–8 (referring to prohibitions on genocide in Article 4(1); 
prohibition on torture of other cruel and unusual punishment in Article 7; and 
prohibition on slavery in Article 8). 
40. See UDHR, supra note 10, art. 29(2) (“In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society.”). 
41. Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1985). 
42. See Toonen v. Australia, No. 488/1992, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶¶ 8.5–8.6 (Apr. 4, 1994). 
43. See id. 
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“status” in terms of enjoyment of all other rights enjoyed by the 
population at large. At the institutional level, for example, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
has recognized that homosexuals are members of a “particular 
social group” for the purposes of the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.44 In its 
publication “Protecting Refugees,” the UNHCR states: 
Homosexuals may be eligible for refugee status on the basis 
of persecution because of their membership of a particular 
social group. It is the policy of the UNHCR that persons 
facing attack, inhumane treatment, or serious 
discrimination because of their homosexuality, and whose 
governments are unable or unwilling to protect them, 
should be recognized as refugees.45 
Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has clarified in its General Comments, Numbers 18 of 
2005 (on the right to work), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water), 
and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health), that the ICESCR prohibits any discrimination on the 
basis of sex and sexual orientation that “has the intention or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise 
of [the right at issue].”46  
At the European legislative level, when dealing with work 
and labor issues, the EU prevents discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. For example, the Council Directive 
                                                                                                                                     
44. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267. 
45. Protecting Refugees: Questions & Answers, U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY (Feb. 1, 2002), 
http://www.unhcr.org.ua/3b779dfe2.html. 
46. See Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 35th Sess., Nov. 7–25, 
2005, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 
2006); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., Nov. 11–29, 2002, 
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water 
(arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); Comm. on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, 22d Sess., Apr. 25–May 12, 2000, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
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2000/78/EC, in establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation (the “Framework 
Directive”),47 provides for the prohibition of discrimination on 
specified grounds (race, religion and belief, disability, age, and 
sexual orientation) related to employment and occupations. 
For example, Article 1 (Purpose) states: “The purpose of 
this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, 
with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the 
principle of equal treatment.”48 And, Article 2 (Concept of 
discrimination) provides: 
1. For the purpose of this Directive, the ‘principle of equal 
treatment’ shall mean that there shall be no direct or 
indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds 
referred to in Article 1. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1: 
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where 
one person is treated less favourably than another is, 
has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 
1. 
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur 
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons having a particular religion 
or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a 
particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons.49 
In terms of jurisprudence, there are cases both at the 
international and regional levels affirming that homosexuality is 
a status that should suffer no discrimination in enjoyment of 
rights. At the international level, consider Young v. Australia, in 
which the HRC decided that cohabitating same-sex partners 
should be treated in the same manner as unmarried 
                                                                                                                                     
47. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC on Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. L 303/16, arts. 1–2 at 16. 
48. Id. art. 1, at 18 (emphasis added). 
49. Id. art. 2, at 18 (emphasis added). 
2012] PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT  399 
heterosexual partners, who were granted pension benefits.50 In 
this particular case, the HRC indicated that “sexual orientation” 
is an “other status” and a ground on which discrimination 
cannot be based under Article 26 of the ICCPR51 There are 
similar decisions in regional jurisprudence, especially at the 
European level. Although the ECHR, like the other 
international covenants, does not explicitly mention sexual 
orientation or sexual identity, the ECtHR has the most 
comprehensive and progressive case law on these issues.52 
Indeed, the Court is increasingly treating sexual orientation as a 
“suspect” classification, thus requiring that states provide 
increasingly compelling reasons to justify it,53 even within the 
“margin of appreciation.”54 For example, in Salgueiro Da Silva 
Mouta v. Portugal, the ECtHR held that giving custody to the 
mother of a child rather than the father on the ground of the 
father’s sexual orientation was discriminatory.55 
Finally, in Karner v. Austria, which dealt with succession of 
tenancy between a deceased man and his gay living partner, the 
ECtHR accepted Austria’s claim (under the margin of 
appreciation) that protection of the family in the traditional 
sense was a “weighty and legitimate reason” that might justify a 
                                                                                                                                     
50. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., July 14–Aug. 8, 2003, Commc’n 
No. 941/2000: Australia (Young v. Australia), ¶¶ 10.2–13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/
941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003). 
51. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 26. 
52. See, e.g., Kerkhoven v. Netherlands, App. No. 15666/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(1992) (unreported); B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 16106/90, 64 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 278 (1990); C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14753/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(1989) (unreported); W.J. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12513/86, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(1987) (unreported); S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11716/85, 47 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 274 (1986). 
53. This would be the equivalent of “strict scrutiny” in US constitutional law. 
54. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Human Rights and Judicial Review: The European Court of 
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
308–09 (David M. Beatty ed., 1994) (explaining the European Court of Human Right’s 
use of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine); id. at 319 (noting, that reduced or 
limited national sovereignty is now accepted in exchange for protection of human 
rights offered by European Convention). The margin of appreciation allows a certain 
level of discretion by states in the interpretation and implementation of the rights 
contained in the European Convention. This margin seems to be narrowing as far as 
discrimination against homosexuals is concerned. See Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 199, 202 (2003). 
55. See Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 311 
(1999). 
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difference in treatment but that not recognizing a gay partner as 
a living companion (a legal category in Austria) was a 
nonnecessary measure and a discriminatory one.56 Reading the 
aforementioned cases, it is possible to follow Rudolf  Bernhardt's 
conclusion that the ECtHR, while allowing for the margin of 
appreciation, has done so in a fairly restricted manner as to what 
state parties can invoke. “In a considerable number of decisions, 
the European Court has stressed that the [ECHR] must be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with present-day 
conditions in law and society, not with past convictions.”57 
In addition, there have been a number of claims before the 
ECtHR that a higher age of consent for male homosexual acts 
than for heterosexual acts constitutes discriminatory treatment 
contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR. Such reasoning appears in 
Sutherland v. United Kingdom; in S.L. v. Austria; in L. v. Austria; 
and in B.B. v. United Kingdom.58  
Nonetheless, note that at the time of this writing, the 
aforementioned jurisprudential evolution seems to stop at 
protecting same-sex marriage. For example, in Joslin v. New 
Zealand the HRC confirmed that the right to marry under the 
ICCPR extended only to marriage between a man and a 
woman.59 Similarly, in the case of Schalk v. Austria, the ECtHR 
stated that the ECHR does not oblige member states to legally 
recognize same-sex marriages.60 Despite this holding, it is 
important for future, and probable, cases to note that the 
ECtHR does not purport to prohibit same-sex marriages.  
The preceding review shows an undeniable evolving 
jurisprudence moving rapidly towards interpreting human rights 
treaties as prohibiting discrimination against sexual orientation 
and identity, with the current exception of same-sex marriage. 
                                                                                                                                     
56. See Karner, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 202.  
57. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 313 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1999). 
58. B.B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 53760/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 23–25 (2004) 
(unreported); L. v. Austria, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 31, 31 (2003); S.L. v. Austria, 2003-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 72, 73 (2003); Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App No. 25186/94, 24 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 25, ¶¶ 3–4 (1997). 
59. U.N. Human Rights Comm., 75th Sess., July 8–26, 2002, Commc’n No. 
902/1999: New Zealand (Joslin v. New Zealand), ¶¶ 8.2–8.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (July 30, 2002). 
60. Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 103–10 (2010) 
(unreported). 
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Does this mean, therefore, that this evolution is only binding on 
states through their specifically ratified treaty obligations, and 
within the scope of their reservations and understandings, or is 
there also already a customary norm, the binding nature of 
which can no longer be avoided by objecting states? Perhaps it is 
possible to affirm that a legal rule has now been recognized, 
even in a context of “much uncertainty and contradiction.” 61 
II. CUSTOM-BASED PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
The second task of this Article is to demonstrate that states 
who express opposition to such nondiscrimination and who 
persist in refusing to transfer international law to domestic 
processes are not merely objecting to what could be a custom in 
the future in an attempt to prevent it, but are already in 
violation of a binding customary norm. In doing so, this Article 
posits that strict legal positivism, with an emphasis on state 
consent as a prerequisite to being bound by a norm regardless 
of its nature, has long ceased to be the dominant doctrine of 
conceptualization of international law, especially in the field of 
human rights. 
A. Custom and Consent in International Law in General 
A reading of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice 
Statute identifies custom as a source of law and defines it as 
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”62 While it is not 
explicit, there is no denying that the Statute referred at the time 
of its writing in 1920 (when creating the Permanent Court of 
International Justice) to practice of states and acceptance by 
states. The unitary nature of sovereign states and the fact that 
they were deemed to be the only subjects of international legal 
system was not questioned much prior to the human rights 
movement following World War II. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice encapsulated that approach in the S.S. 
Lotus case, noting that: “[t]he rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages as generally accepted as expressing 
                                                                                                                                     
61. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20). 
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
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principles of law . . . . Restrictions upon the independence of 
States cannot therefore be presumed.”63 
The idea was that a sovereign state cannot be compelled to 
comply with a norm it has not agreed to by treaty and that the 
conduct of others states cannot in itself bind it. Strict positivism, 
defended by Hans Kelsen in Pure Theory of Law in the 1930s,64 in 
general, and in the S.S. Lotus case, in particular, has been 
criticized for several reasons. Subsequent authors and judicial 
decisions have started taking into account the sociological aspect 
of international law—which implies taking into consideration 
the changing nature of international society, especially the rise 
of actors other than states, and the dynamic nature of its 
evolution. For example, Roscoe Pound views law as a form of 
social engineering in constant evolution.65 Christian Tomuschat 
sees international legal order not as an expression of consent 
but as a sociological necessity whereby “the cohesive legal bonds 
tying States to one another have considerably strengthened 
since the coming into force of the United Nations Charter.”66 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins emphasizes the nature of “international 
law as a process rather than rules;”67 and further states that 
“international law is a continuing process . . . that must respond 
to a changing political world and cannot simply rely on 
accumulated past decisions.”68 The New Haven School has also 
criticized positivism as remaining “fixated on the past, trying to 
reap from words laid down, irrespective of the context in which 
they were written, the solution to a problem that arises today or 
tomorrow in very different circumstances.”69 The decreasing 
dominance of a doctrine of strict state voluntarism in creating 
                                                                                                                                     
63. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
64. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. 
Press 2d prtg. 1970) (2d ed. 1967). 
65. See ROSCOE POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 116–19 (5th 
ed. 1943). 
66. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States without or against Their Will, 
241 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 210 (1993). 
67. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW 
WE USE IT 148 (1994). 
68. Id. at 2.  
69. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and 
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 316, 320 (1999). 
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obligations is nowhere more evident than in the human rights 
movement. 
B. Consent and Customary Norms of Human Rights: The Consent of 
the Community At-Large Replacing State Consent in the Formulation of 
Opinio Juris 
Indeed, the aftermath of World War II gave rise to an 
international human rights movement “out of a spreading 
conviction that how human beings are treated anywhere 
concerns everyone, everywhere.”70 This movement changed the 
conceptualization of sovereignty, and by extension challenged 
strict positivism. The claim that treatment of its own citizens is 
strictly the domestic problem of a sovereign state was no longer 
acceptable. To a degree, what Louis Henkin calls the “age of 
rights”71 is not only a departure from strict legal positivism but 
also a resurgence of natural law, asserting that certain rights 
exist regardless of positive, or man-made, laws. This is the 
interpretation of the Nuremberg Trials that Quincy Wright 
provides when he argues that superior principles of justice 
determined by the international community—not by individual 
states—formed part of the Nuremberg judgment.72 Indeed, at 
the apex of this school of thought, jus cogens norms such as the 
prohibition of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity 
can suffer no derogation regardless of the will of individual 
states and can only be changed by consensus of the international 
community of states.73 Thus, it can be posited, as Jonathan 
Charney does, that acceptance is required only by the 
international community and not by all individual states.74 As a 
                                                                                                                                     
70. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 14 (1st ed. 1990), reprinted in LOUIS 
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 278 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
71. See HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 13–20. 
72. Quincy Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 
405, 414 (1948). 
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”) 
74. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 536 
(1993). 
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result, when dealing with human rights, the possibility of finding 
universal norms can be asserted, the acceptance of which comes 
from the overall international community rather than from the 
sum of the will of all individual states. Furthermore, it is this 
Article’s contention that, in the field of human rights, it is 
increasingly impossible for any state to defy an emerging 
customary norm on the basis of persistent objector. 
Consequently, for all the divergent practices and vocal 
opposition by several states, they cannot escape the binding 
nature of the norm prohibiting discrimination against gays and 
transgendered people. 
C. The Issue of Permanent Objector 
There is no denying that there is no general and uniform 
practice of states on the issue, and that there is a correlated 
explicit opposition to nondiscrimination. In terms of legislative 
practices, various data kept by nongovernmental organizations, 
such as the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association75 and World Focus,76 present each country’s 
position on issues ranging from adoption and male-male 
relationships to the ability to legally change genders. 
Undoubtedly, it shows a wide range of practices by states. World 
Focus has created a map that graphically illustrates how the 
world is split on the issues ranging from the recognition of same-
sex marriage in Canada, Spain, and Scandinavian countries, to 
the imposition of the death penalty on homosexuals in several 
African and Middle Eastern countries.77  
                                                                                                                                     
75. See INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS & INTERSEX ASS’N, http://ilga.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2012). World Legal Survey is to this day the only database on 
legislations affecting Lesbians, Gays, Bisexual and Transgender people around the 
world. The World Legal Survey is widely consulted as a resource for those working to 
promote LGBT rights, whether they be activists, lawyers, academics or people working 
in the media. See id. 
76. See WORLD FOCUS, http://worldfocus.org/blog/tag/gay-rights/ (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2012). World Focus is one of few international news organizations that regularly 
reports on the issues that affect LGBT people throughout the world. 
77. This map is World Focus’ creation and provides a visual depiction of the 
various levels of recognition of the LGBT community worldwide. See Tracking the 
Legality of Same-Sex Marriage around the World, WORLD FOCUS (Dec. 29, 2009), 
http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/12/29/tracking-the-legality-of-same-sex-marriage-
around-the-world/9035/. 
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In terms of vocal and persistent objections, consider the 
explicit “no” votes in United Nations’ (“UN”) or in regional 
institutions’ Declarations. The finalized Yogyakarta Principles78 
were launched as a global charter for gay rights on March 26, 
2007, at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, 
and indeed shaped the subsequent 2008 UN Declaration on 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Fifty-seven countries, as 
well as the Vatican, virulently opposed this Declaration, 
including members of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (“OIC”).79 The latter issued a joint statement, 
criticizing the initiative as an attempt to give special prominence 
to gays and lesbians. The statement suggested that protecting 
sexual orientation could lead to “the social normalization and 
possibly the legalization of deplorable acts” such as pedophilia 
and incest.80 Similar opposition faced the aforementioned 
Human Rights Council Decision of June 17, 2011. It was 
opposed by nineteen out of forty-five member nations.81 Several 
African and Middle Eastern nations, spearheaded by Nigeria, 
criticized South Africa’s sponsoring of the Resolution, accusing 
the nation of “westernizing” and breaking from what “90 
percent” of South Africans want, and decrying the UN trying to 
force controversial ideas with no legal basis on their countries.82 
The OIC concurred: “OIC states are deeply concerned by the . 
. . resolution that intends to discuss very controversial notions 
that are on sexual orientation,” with Pakistan speaking on behalf 
of the OIC.83 Further, the OIC was “seriously concerned at the 
                                                                                                                                     
78. See generally Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ principles_
en.htm. 
79. See Neil MacFarquhar, In a First, Gay Rights are Pressed at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2008, at A22; see also PIOTR BĄKOWSKI, FIRST UN RESOLUTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2011/110218/
LDM_BRI(2011)110218_REV1_EN.pdf. 
80. See David Crary, United Nations: First Gay Rights Declaration Wins Much Support, 
United States Opposes It, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2008, 12:08 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/19/united-nations-first-gay-_n_152325.html.  
81. See supra note 3. 
82. See Pakistan Concerned over UN Gay Resolution, THE NATION (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/
International/18-Jun-2011/Pakistan-concerned-over-UN-gay-resolution-passage. 
83. See id. 
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attempt to introduce to the United Nations some notions that 
have no legal foundation.”84 
The opposition described above may be explicit and indeed 
amounts to a persistent objection, but a few analogies can easily 
demonstrate the weakness of the argument on a legal basis. As 
many observers have suggested: “Should South Africa during the 
period of Apartheid have been considered exempt from the 
customary rule prohibiting systematic racial discrimination 
because it persistently dissented from that rule during the time 
the rule was being developed?”85 Indeed, such objection is not 
possible for peremptory norms such as racial discrimination. 
Similar reasoning thus extends to other rights even if they are 
not of a jus cogens nature. The death penalty provides a good 
example. For decades, the United States consistently objected to 
the prohibition of juvenile death penalty, either by treaty 
reservation86 or by statements to that effect,87 in essence denying 
the existence of a binding custom by rejecting it. Yet, the US 
Supreme Court concluded that juvenile death penalty was no 
longer compatible with evolving standard of decency,88 thus 
recognizing the impossibility of objecting to the changing values 
of the international society. 
Ted Stein encapsulates the viewpoint that the persistent 
objection can only: 
[P]reserve the rights already enjoyed by the objector, where 
subsequent development in customary international law 
threatened their diminution . . . . [There is] a repudiation 
of the notion that there exists a residual rule of freedom in 
international law, a rule allowing states to engage in any 
                                                                                                                                     
84. See David Crary & Frank Jordans, U.N Gay Rights Protection Resolution Passes, 
Hailed as ‘Historic Moment', HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2011), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/06/17/un-gay-rights-protection-resolution-passes-_n_879032.html.  
85. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 103 
(5th ed. 2009). 
86. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (1992) (“That the United States reserves the 
right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any 
person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws 
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”). 
87. See Domingues v. Nevada, 917 P.2d 1364, 1378 (Nev. 1996) (“We conclude 
that the death sentence [for a juvenile] was not imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor, nor was it excessive in this case.”). 
88. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005). 
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activity whatsoever in the absence of a prescription 
emerging for positive law processes. 89 
Jonathan Chaney echoes this opinion that solving global 
problems, such as the environment or human rights violations, 
“must not be thwarted by the objections or actions of a few 
obstinate states,”90 and that “the present views of states certainly 
contribute to an understanding of international law, but they 
are not the only considerations.”91 Finally, as it applies to the 
topic at hand, there is further judicial affirmation of this 
viewpoint in Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, when the ECtHR 
considered that it could not ignore “widespread and consistently 
developing views or the legal changes in the domestic laws of 
Contracting States in favour of the admission of homosexuals 
into the armed forces of those States.”92 
CONCLUSION 
Reviewing treaty-based obligations as to nondiscrimination, 
judicial decisions that treat “other status” as a concept 
encompassing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered 
(“LGBT”) individuals, and recognizing that sexual orientation 
or gender identity do not represent an objective and reasonable 
criteria to prevent individuals from the enjoyment of their civil 
and economic rights, should suffice to affirm that even though 
there are no specific treaties yet as to the prohibition of all 
forms of discrimination against LGBT people, there are already 
sufficient binding provisions to that effect. Furthermore, the 
dynamic nature of international law allows it to evolve with 
circumstances, thanks to changes in practices and perceptions, 
which occur faster than treaty-writing. This Article finds that 
there is already a large amount of states favoring 
nondiscrimination, and that their number is growing, as 
expressed in various regional and international declarations and 
resolutions, the last one being that of the Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                     
89. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 457, 477 (1985)  
90. See Charney, supra note 74, at 551. 
91. Id. at 540. 
92. Press Release, Registry of Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgments in the Cases of Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom and Smith and Grady v. The United 
Kingdom (Sept. 27, 1999), available at lgbt.poradna-prava.cz/folder05/lustig.doc. 
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Council of June 17, 2011. Furthermore, as this line of practice 
grows, objections of other states no longer exclude them from 
being bound by the principle of nondiscrimination against 
LGBT individuals. Therefore, the prohibition of discrimination 
against LGBT individuals is now a part of international human 
rights law, and a norm binding on all. 
